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Abstract Security vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies are a growing
concern not only for developers of the affected software, but for the risks it
poses to an entire software ecosystem e.g., Heartbleed vulnerability. Recent
studies show that developers are slow to respond to the threat of a vulnerabil-
ity, sometimes taking four to eleven months to act. To ensure quick adoption
and propagation of a release that contains the fix (fixing release), we conduct
an empirical investigation to identify lags that may occur between the vulnera-
ble release and its fixing release (fixing release update). Through a preliminary
study of 131 fixing releases of npm projects on GitHub, we observe that a
fixing release is rarely released on their own, with up to 92.86% of the bundled
commits being unrelated to a fix. We then compare the fixing release update
with changes on the client-side (client-side fixing release update). Through an
empirical study of the adoption and propagation tendencies of 188 fixing re-
leases that impact throughout a network of 882,222 npm packages, we find
that stale clients require additional migration effort, even if the fixing release
was quick (i.e., patch landing). Furthermore, we find that factors such as the
branch that the fixing release lands on and the severity of the vulnerability
influences its propagation. In addition to these lags that we identify and char-
acterize, this paper lays the groundwork for future research on how to mitigate
propagation lags in an ecosystems
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1 Introduction
Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies are a growing concern for the soft-
ware developer. In a 2018 report, over four million vulnerabilities were raised
to the attention of the developers of over 500 thousand GitHub repositories
(GitHub, 2018a). The risk of vulnerabilities is not restricted to the direct users
of these software artifacts, but it also extends to the broader software ecosys-
tems to which they belong. Examples include the ShellShock (Bennett, 2014)
and Heartbleed (Synopsys, 2014) vulnerabilities, which caused widespread
damage to broad and diverse software ecosystems made up of direct and in-
direct adopters. Indeed, the case of Heartbleed emphasized its critical role in
the modern web. McAfee estimates1 that OpenSSL i.e., the project where the
Heartbleed vulnerability originated, is present on the web servers that host (at
least) 66% of the sites and (at least) 20% of the secure sites on the internet.
The speed at which ecosystems react to vulnerabilities and the availability
of fixes to vulnerabilities is of paramount importance. Three lines of prior work
support this the intuition:
1. Studies by Hejderup (2015); Howard and Leblanc (2001); Munaiah et al
(2017); Nguyen et al (2016); Pashchenko et al (2018); Ponta et al (2018);
Williams et al (2018) encourage developers to use security best practices
e.g., project validation, security monitoring, to prevent and detect vulner-
abilities in deployed projects.
2. Studies by Cox et al (2015); Decan et al (2017, 2018); Kikas et al (2017)
show that vulnerabilities can cascade transitively through package depen-
dency networks. Moreover, they observe that security issues are more likely
to occur in the field due to stale (outdated) dependencies than directly
within product code.
3. Studies by Bavota et al (2015); Bogart et al (2016); Ihara et al (2017);
Kula et al (2018) show that developers are slow to update their vulnerable
packages, which is sometimes due to management and process factors.
While these prior studies have made important advances, they have tended
to focus on a coarse granularity that focused on the vulnerable dependency
e.g., releases. Only a few works focus on the fix contents at the commit-level
granularity and evaluate fixing with respect to the vulnerable dependency only.
To bridge this research gap, we set out to identify and characterize the re-
lease, adoption, and propagation tendencies of vulnerability fixes. We identify
and track a release that contains the fix, which is defined as a fixing release.
We then identify lags that may occur between the detection of a vulnera-
bility in a release and its subsequent fixing release, which is defined as the
fixing release update. Based on semantic versioning (Preston-Werner, 2009), a
fixing release update is a major landing, minor landing, or patch landing.
From a client perspective, we identify client-side fixing release update lags to
classify how a client migrates from a vulnerable version to the fixing version as
1 https://www.sanfordbrown.edu/Student-Life/blog/October-2014/
Heartbleed-Impact-So-Far
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a major client landing, minor client landing, patch client landing,
and dependency removal. By comparing the fixing releases updates with the
client-side fixing release update, we identify lags in the adoption process as
clients keep stale dependencies.
Our empirical study is comprised of two parts. First, we perform a prelim-
inary study of 131 fixing releases of npm projects on GitHub. We find that the
fixing release is rarely released on its own, with up to 92.86% of the bundled
commits being unrelated to the fix. Second, we conduct an empirical study
of 188 fixing releases to analyze their adoption and propagation tendencies
throughout a network of 882,222 npm packages. We find that quickly releasing
fixes does not ensure that clients will adopt them quickly. Indeed, we find that
only 17.69% of clients reacted to this by performing a patch client landing of
their own. Furthermore, we find that factors such as the branch upon which
a fix lands and the severity of the vulnerability influence its propagation tra-
jectory throughout the ecosystem i.e., the latest lineage and medium severity
suffer the most lags.
Our contributions are three-fold. The first contribution is a set of defi-
nitions and measures to characterize the vulnerability discovery and fix re-
lease process from both the vulnerable library and its client. The second con-
tribution is an empirical study that identified potential lags in the release,
adoption, and propagation of a fixing release. Third, we contribute a detailed
replication package, which is available at https://github.com/NAIST-SE/
Vulnerability-Fix-Lags-Release-Adoption-Propagation.
1.1 Paper Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes key
concepts and definitions. Section 3 presents the motivations, approaches, and
results of our preliminary study. Section 4 introduces the concepts of fix adop-
tion and propagation with the empirical study to identify them. We then dis-
cuss implications of our results and threats to validity of the study in Section
5. Section 6 surveys the related works. Finally, Section 7 concludes the study.
2 Concepts and Definitions
2.1 Vulnerability Fixing Process
Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of the vulnerability fixing process of package
P. We break down this process into two steps:
Step one: Vulnerability Discovery. Figure 1 shows the vulnerability of pack-
age P being detected after the release of PV 1.1.0. As reported by Kula et al
(2018), CVE defines four phases of a vulnerability: (i) threat detection, (ii)
CVE assessment, (iii) security advisory, and (iv) patch release. We define the
vulnerability discovery as the period between the threat detection and before
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The distribu,on of vulnerability fixes
V1.0.0
V1.1.1 V1.1.2
V1.0.2 V1.0.3
V2.0.0 V2.0.1
V1.1.3
Package P
Fixing
commit
V1.0.1
V1.1.0
Fixing release update
Fixing releaseVulnerable 
release
Fig. 1 Vulnerability discovery, fix, and release process of package P over time. Red and
green releases indicate whether releases are vulnerable or not.
the patch release. It is most likely that the fixing process starts after the CVE
assessment i.e., a vulnerability has been assigned a CVE number. In addition
to a CVE number, a vulnerability report details the affected packages, which
can include releases up to an upper-bound of reported versions. In this step,
the developers of an affected package are notified via communication channels
such as a GitHub issue for GitHub projects.
Step two: Vulnerability Fix and Release. Figure 1 shows the vulnerability of
package P being fixed and released as PV 1.1.1. We define the vulnerability fix
and release as the period where developers spend their efforts to identify and
mitigate the vulnerable code. Once the fix is ready, developers merge that
fix to a package repository. In most GitHub projects, developers will review
changes via a GitHub pull request. Semantic versioning convention is also used
to manage a release version number of a package (Preston-Werner, 2009). We
define the fixing release as the first release that contains a vulnerability fix
(PV 1.1.1). We also define the difference between a vulnerable release and a
fixing release as the fixing release update (PV 1.1.0 to PV 1.1.1 is classified as a
patch landing).
2.2 Motivating Example
Figure 2 shows a practical case of the vulnerability fixing process which affects
a library for network communication i.e., socket.io. Figure 2(a) and Figure
2(b) show step one, where the vulnerability is reported as a GitHub issue2 and
summarized in snyk.io3. The vulnerability report contains detailed information
regarding the identified problem, its severity, and a proof-of-concept to confirm
the threat. In this example, socket.io was vulnerable to a medium severity
vulnerability. We also found that the reporter is the same person who also
created the fix. Figure 2(c) and 2(d) show step two. Figure 2(c) shows a fix
that will be merged into the code base. The fix is submitted in the form of a
2 https://github.com/socketio/socket.io/issues/856
3 https://snyk.io/vuln/npm:socket.io:20120323
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(a) socket.io vulnerability report with medium severity.
(b) GitHub Issue reporting the vulnerabil-
ity.
(c) Pull request containing the fixing com-
mit.
(d) Fixing commit to mitigate the vulnerability.
Fig. 2 Developer artifacts that mitigate a vulnerability (socket.io) on GitHub.
pull request4. Figure 2(d) shows that there are four commits in a pull request
with one commit actually fixes the vulnerability5. The other three commits
were found to be unrelated e.g., "removing fixes for other bug".
Interestingly, there is a lag in the vulnerability fix and release step. This
example shows that there is an 89 days period between when the fix was
created and released for any client to use. We found that socket.io merged
it fixes on 27 April 2012, however, it was actually released on 25 July 20126
and classified as a patch landing i.e., V0.9.7.
4 https://github.com/socketio/socket.io/pull/857
5 https://github.com/socketio/socket.io/commit/67b4eb9abdf111dfa9be4176d1709374a2b4ded8
6 https://github.com/socketio/socket.io/releases/tag/0.9.7
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3 Preliminary Study: Fix Commits and Landing
From the motivating example in Section 2.2, we identified a lag between cre-
ation and actual release of the fix. Thus, we conduct a preliminary study to
identify possible lags that may occur during the vulnerability fix and release
step at the commit-level. We first highlight the motivation, approach, and
analysis to answer our preliminary questions. We then show our data collec-
tion and finally provide the results. The following two preliminary questions
guide the study:
(PQ1) What is the prevalence of patch landing?
– Motivation Our motivation for (PQ1) is to analyze the fixing release up-
date. Different from Decan et al (2018), we manually investigate the version
changes in the fixing release itself. Our assumption is that every fix is ap-
plied as a patch landing.
– Approach The approach to answer (PQ1) involves a manual investigation
to identify the fixing release update i.e., major, minor, patch. This is done
in three steps.
1. The first step is to extract the fix-related information on GitHub. The
extracted information are captured into three types as (i) an issue, (ii)
a commit, and (iii) a pull request.
2. The second step is to identify the release that contains a fix. This step
involves a investigation of the package history. From the link in the
first step, the first author manually tracked the git commit history to
identify when the fix was applied.
3. The final step is to identify a difference between a vulnerable release
and a fixing release. We compare a vulnerable release i.e., listed in the
report, against a fixing release to categorize the fixing release update:
(i) major landing, (ii) minor landing, and (iii) patch landing.
– Analysis The analysis to answer (PQ1) is the investigation of vulnerability
fixing release updates. We use a summary statistic to show the fixing release
update distribution. Furthermore, an interesting example case from the
result is used to confirm and explain our findings.
(PQ2) What portion of the release content is a vulnerability fix?
– Motivation Extending (PQ1), our motivation for (PQ2) is to reveal what
kind of contents are bundled within the fixing release. We compliment re-
cent studies, but at the commit-level (Decan et al, 2018; Hejderup, 2015).
We would like to evaluate the assumption that commits bundled in a fix-
ing release are mostly related to the fixing commits.
– Approach The approach to answer (PQ2) involves a manual investigation
of contents inside the fixing release. This is done in three steps.
1. The first step is to gather information of a fix commit. In this case, we
tracked the git commit history similar to the second step of (PQ1).
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Table 1 A summary of collected dataset information for preliminary study.
npm Vulnerability Report Information
Disclosures Period 9 Apr. 2009 – 16 Nov. 2016
# Vul. Reports 792
# Vul. Reports (with fix references) 131
2. The second step is to list commits in a fixing release. We use GitHub
comparing changes tool7 to perform this task.
3. The final step is to identify the type of commits bundled in a fixing re-
lease. Similar to (PQ1), the first author manually tracked and labeled
the commit as either (i) fixing commit or (ii) other commit. To la-
bel commits, the first author uses source codes, commit messages and
GitHub pull request information. For validation, other co-authors con-
firmed the results i.e., one author found the evidence and the other
validated.
– Analysis The analysis to answer (PQ2) is to examine the portion of fix-
ing commits in a fixing release. We show the cumulative frequency distri-
bution to describe the distribution of fixing commits for 131 fixing releases.
We use a box plot to show fixing commit size in terms of lines of code (LoC).
Similar to (PQ1), we show interesting example cases from the result.
3.1 Data Collection
Our dataset contains the vulnerability reports with fix-related information on
GitHub. For the vulnerability reports, we crawled the data from snyk.io (Snyk,
2015) that were originally disclosed in CVE and CWE database. For the fix-
related information, we focus on packages from npm JavaScript ecosystem that
is one of the largest package collection on GitHub (NPM, 2010) and also has
been the focus of recent studies (Abdalkareem et al, 2017; Decan et al, 2017,
2018; Hejderup, 2015; Kikas et al, 2017). At the time of study, we extracted
fix-related information links directly from snyk.io e.g., GitHub issue, commit,
pull request.
As shown in Table 1, we crawled and collected all reports from 9 April 2009
to 16 November 2016 i.e., in total 792 reports. To identify the reports with fix-
related information, we removed reports that (i) do not have the fixing release
or (ii) do not provide any fix-related information. In the end, our dataset
includes 131 reports.
3.2 Results to the Preliminary Study
7 https://help.github.com/en/github/committing-changes-to-your-project/
comparing-commits
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Table 2 A summary statistic of fixing release update distribution in (PQ1).
Fixing release update # of fixing releases
Major landing 9 (6.87%)
Minor landing 47 (35.88%)
Patch landing 75 (57.25%)
131
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Fig. 3 We find that 93.89% out of 131 fixing releases have up to 7.14% confirmed fix-
ing commits.
(PQ1) What is the prevalence of patch landing?
Table 2 shows the evidence that not every fix is applied as a patch. This
evidence contradicts our assumption. We find that 57.25% of fixes are a patch
landing. On the other hand, we find that 6.87% and 35.88% of fixes are major
and minor landings respectively.
The example case is a major landing of an HTTP server framework i.e.,
connect (V2.0.0). This package was vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS)
attack (Snyk, 2017a). Under closer investigation, we manually validated that
the other fixes were bundled in a fixing release, including API breaking changes
(i.e., removed function)8. This fix also takes 53 days before it get released. We
find that this may cause a lag in the fixing release, especially if the project has
a release cycle.
Summary: We find that fix not always released as its own patch up-
date. We find that only 57.25% of fixing release are a patch landing.
The rest of fixing releases are either major landing i.e., 6.87%, or minor
landing i.e., 35.88%.
(PQ2) What portion of the release content is a vulnerability fix?
Figure 3 is evidence that fixes are usually bundled with other kinds of changes.
We find that 93.89% out of 131 fixing releases have up to 7.14% commits that
8 https://github.com/senchalabs/connect/blob/fe28026347c2653a9602240236fc43a8f0ff8e87/
History.md#200--2011-10-05
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Fig. 4 LoC of the fix for 131 vulnerabilities. We see that the fix is relatively small i.e.,
median of 8.
related to the fix, which means that 92.86% of commits were unrelated. Figure
4 shows that the fix itself tends to be smaller in size i.e., median of eight LoC.
This result confirms the findings of (PQ1) and illustrates some lags in the
fixing release.
We show two examples to investigate the fix content and its size. The first
example is a patch landing of a simple publish-subscribe messing for a web
i.e., faye (Snyk, 2017b). Under closer manual inspection, we find that there
is one commit that updates the default value of variables9. However, a patch
landing includes a total of 45 commits that not related to the fix10. In the
second example, we show that the actual fix is a very small lines of code.
The npm package, which is the command line interface of JavaScript package
manager (Snyk, 2017c), took seven lines of code11 to fix the vulnerability.
Summary: We find that a small portion of the release content is re-
lated, with 93.89% of 131 fixing releases having up to 92.86% unrelated
commits. Furthermore, we found that the fix itself tends to be smaller
in size (i.e., median of eight lines of code).
4 Lags after the Fixing Release
The results of our preliminary study identified lags before the fixing release,
where we find that (i) up to 57.25% of vulnerability fixes are classified as a
patch landing and (ii) up to 92.86% of commits in a release are unrelated.
Based on these results, we perform an empirical evaluation to explore other
potential lags in the adoption and propagation of the fix. Complementary prior
works (Cox et al, 2015; Decan et al, 2018; Kikas et al, 2017) have shown some
evidence of a lag in the update. Different to these works, we model the release
9 https://github.com/faye/faye/commit/e407e08c68dd885896552b59ce65503be85030ad
10 https://github.com/faye/faye/compare/0.8.8...0.8.9
11 https://github.com/npm/npm/commit/f4d31693
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Client X V2.0.1V2.0.0
Client-side fixing release update
V1.0.0
V1.1.1 V1.1.2
V1.0.2 V1.0.3
V2.0.0 V2.0.1
V1.1.3
Package P
Fixing
commit
V1.0.1
V1.1.0
Fixing release update
Fixing releaseVulnerable 
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Fig. 5 An example of a lag in the initial adoption, caused by the client-side fixing release
update.
of different versions as separated branches rather than being linear. Hence, the
adoption and propagation is tracked across the different branches.
4.1 Client-side fixing release update
Prior work suggests that lags in adoption could be the result of migration
effort (Kula et al, 2018). Thus to quantify this effort, we compare a vulnerable
release that a client is using i.e., listed in the report, against the fixing release
to categorize as a client-side fixing release update. Developers of the vulnerable
package fulfilled their responsibility, thus the adoption responsibility is left to
the client.
Figure 5 is an extension from Figure 1, which includes the timelines of
a fixing release and its clients. Figure 5 shows that client X suffers a lag in
the adoption of a fixing release by switching dependency branches i.e., minor
client landing. As shown in the figure, client X directly depends on package P.
Client X is vulnerable (V2.0.0) due to its dependency (PV 1.0.1). To mitigate
the vulnerability, package P creates a new branch i.e., minor branch, which
includes the fixing release (PV 1.1.1). Client X finally adopts the new release of
package P which is not vulnerable (V1.1.2). We consider that client X has a lag,
which was not efficient because it actually skipped the fixing release (PV 1.1.1).
Instead, client X adopted the next release (PV 1.1.2). A possible cause of lags is
the potential migration effort needed to switch branches i.e., from PV 1.0.1 to
PV 1.1.2. This migration effort involving a minor or major change may includes
breaking changes or issues in the release cycle.
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The distribution of vulnerability fixes
Client X
V0.0.1 V0.0.2 V0.0.3
V2.0.1V2.0.0 Adopted
Client Y
Adopted
V1.0.0
V1.1.1 V1.1.2
V1.0.2 V1.0.3
V2.0.0 V2.0.1
V1.1.3
Package P
Fixing
commit
V1.0.1
V1.1.0
Fixing release update
Fixing releaseVulnerable 
release
(a) An example of a lag in the propagation, caused by cascade delays from upstream
clients.
V1.0.0
V1.1.1 V1.1.2
V1.0.2 V1.0.3
V2.0.0 V2.0.1
V1.1.3
Package P
V1.0.1
V1.1.0
(b) An example of a Latest Lineage (LL) and a Supported Lineage (SL) classify to
track freshness of a fixing release.
Fig. 6 These figures show the metrics that are used to model and track the lags.
4.2 Model and Track Lags
To measure lags in both adoption and propagation, we model and track the
fixing release as illustrated in Figure 6.
Released and Adopted by Version - We identify lags in the adoption by an
analysis of patterns between a fixing release and adopted clients using two
metrics, which is similar to technical lag Zerouali et al (2018) and based on
a semantic versioning. The first metric was defined in (PQ1) as a fixing re-
lease update. Note that pre-releases or special releases are not considered in
this study. The second metric measures the difference between a vulnerable
release and its fixing release adopted in clients. We define the second metric
as a client-side fixing release update. This metric classifies the adoption into
four types: major client landing, minor client landing, patch client
landing, and dependency removal.
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Figure 6(a) shows an example of the two metrics defined above. First,
we find that the fixing release update for package P is classified as a patch
landing. This is because of the difference between a fixing release (PV 1.1.1)
and its vulnerable release (PV 1.1.0). Furthermore, we find that the client-side
fixing release update for client X is a minor client landing. This is because
of the difference between the adopted fixing release (PV 1.1.2) and its previous
vulnerable release (PV 1.0.1).
Propagation Influencing Factors - We define Downstream Propagation as the
transitive dependency distance between a fixing release and any downstream
clients that have adopted this fix i.e., 1, 2, 3 and more than or equal to 4
hops. As shown in Figure 6(a), client X is one hop away from package P. We
consider two different factors to model and track lags in the propagation:
1. Lineage Freshness: refers to the freshness of the fixing release as inspired
by Cox et al (2015) and Kula et al (2018). Figure 6(b) shows two types of
lineage freshness based on the release branches including: Latest Lineage
(LL): the client has adopted any fixing release on the latest branch, and
Supported Lineage (SL): the client has adopted any fixing release not on
the latest branch. Our assumption is that a fixing release in the latest
lineage is adopted faster than a fixing release in a supported lineage i.e.,
suffer less lags. Figure 6(b) shows that three versions of package P (V1.0.2,
V1.0.3, V1.1.3) are classified as SL.
2. Vulnerability Severity: refers to severity of vulnerability i.e., H = high, M
= medium, L = low, as indicated in the vulnerability report (as shown in
Figure 2(a) from Section 2). Our assumption is that a fixing release with
higher severity is adopted quicker i.e., less lags.
4.3 Empirical Evaluation
The goal of our empirical study is to investigate lags in the adoption and
propagation. We use these two research questions to guide our study:
(RQ1) Is the fixing release update consistent with the client-side
fix release update? Our motivation for (RQ1) is to understand whether
developers are keeping up to date with the library releases. Our key assumption
is that a major or minor client landing requires more migration effort, which
in turn is likely to create lags.
(RQ2) Do lineage freshness and severity influence lags in the fix
propagation? Our motivation for (RQ2) is to identify the existence of lags dur-
ing a propagation. Concretely, we use our defined metrics i.e., propagation in-
fluencing factors, to characterize a propagation lag. Our assumption is that a
fixing release on the latest lineage with high severity should propagates quick.
Lags in the Release, Adoption, and Propagation of npm Vulnerability Fixes 13
Table 3 A summary of collected dataset information for empirical study.
npm JavaScript Ecosystem Information
Repository Snapshot 17 Dec 2017
# Extracted Package GitHub Repositories 154,425
# Matched Package GitHub Repositories 42,980
# Total Dependencies (with downstream) 83,427
# Total Packages Releases 882,222
npm Vulnerability Report Information
Disclosures Period 9 Apr. 2009 – 16 Nov. 2016
# Extracted Reports 792
# Matched Reports 188
High severity 47
Medium severity 128
Low severity 13
(RQ1) Dataset
# Vul. Reports (follow semver) 75
# Vulnerable Packages (follow semver) 43
# Direct Clients (follow semver) 5,133
# Filtered Clients (break semver) 7,141
(RQ2) Dataset
# Vul. Reports (with fix released) 136
# Vulnerable Packages (with fix released) 74
# Downstream Clients 19,583
Data Collection - Similar to our preliminary study, the collected data includes
vulnerability reports and information extracted from cloned npm packages as
inspired by Wittern et al (2016). To ensure the quality of datasets, we first
filter out vulnerabilities that do not have the available fix. We then used the
package name and its GitHub link from reports to automatically match cloned
repositories.
As shown in Table 3, our initial collection included 792 vulnerability reports
that disclosed from 9 April 2009 to 16 November 2016 before the filter process.
For package repositories, we collected a repository snapshot from GitHub on 17
December 2017 with 154,425 repositories. To make sure that the fixing release
is included in the datasets, we captured a one year lag. This is according to the
assumption that more than 90% of fixing releases occurred in a year (Decan
et al, 2018). After the filter process was completed, our final datasets include
42,980 repositories (including all downstream clients) with 188 vulnerability
reports.
Approach to Answer RQ1 - The data processing to answer (RQ1) involves the
fixing release update and client-side fixing release update extraction. Similar
to (PQ1), we first identify the fixing release update by comparing a vulnerable
release and a fixing release. To track the client-side fixing release update, we
then extract the direct clients version history of the vulnerable packages. A
client is deemed vulnerable if its lower-bound dependency falls within the
reported upper-bound as listed in a vulnerability report.
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Table 4 A summary number of filtered clients grouped by their update pattern in (RQ1).
SemVer Update Patterns # clients
Major only 97
Minor only 320
Patch only 2,588
No change 4,136
To ensure quality, we additionally filter out clients that did not follow
semantic versioning as shown Table 4. Our key assumption is to keep clients
that follow a semantic version release cycle i.e., clients should have all the
update pattern of major, minor, and patch landings. As a result, 7,141 clients
were filtered out from the dataset. As shown in Table 3, our final dataset for
(RQ1) consists of 75 vulnerability reports, 43 vulnerable packages, and 5,133
clients.
The analysis to answer (RQ1) is the identification of lags in the adop-
tion. We show the frequency distribution of client-side fixing release update in
each fixing release update. In order to statistically validate our results, we ap-
ply Pearson’s chi-squared test (χ2) (Pearson, 1900) with the null hypothesis
‘the fixing release update and the client-side fixing release update are indepen-
dent’. To support the hypothesis, we investigate the effect size using Cramér’s
V (φ′), which is a measure of association between two nominal categories
(Cramér, 1946). According to Cohen (1988), effect size is analyzed as follows:
(1) φ′ < 0.07 as Negligible, (2) 0.07 ≤ φ′ < 0.20 as Small, (3) 0.20 ≤ φ′ < 0.35
as Medium, or (4) 0.35 ≥ φ′ as Large. To analyze Cramér’s V, we use the
researchpy package12.
Approach to Answer RQ2 - The data processing to answer (RQ2) involves
propagation influencing factors extraction. There are three steps to track
downstream propagation, and classify lineage freshness and severity. First,
we build and traverse in a dependency tree for each fixing release using a
breadth-first search (BFS) approach. The meta-data is collected from each
downstream client which includes: (i) version, (ii) release date, and (iii) de-
pendency list i.e., exact version and ranged version. We then classify whether
or not client is vulnerable using the approach similar to (RQ1). Our method
involves removing duplicated clients in the dependency tree, which is caused
by the npm tree structure. Second, we classify the lineage freshness of a fix-
ing release by confirming that it is on the latest branch. Finally, we extract the
vulnerability severity from the report. As shown in Table 3, our final dataset
for (RQ2) consists of 136 vulnerability reports, 74 vulnerable packages with
fixes, and 19,583 downstream clients.
The analysis to answer (RQ2) is the identification of lags in the propaga-
tion. We show a summary statistic of lags in terms of days i.e., the mean, the
median, the standard deviation, and the frequency distribution, with two in-
fluencing factors. In order to statistically validate the differences in the results,
12 https://pypi.org/project/researchpy/
Lags in the Release, Adoption, and Propagation of npm Vulnerability Fixes 15
Table 5 A contingency table shows the frequency distribution of client-side fixing release
update for each fixing release update.
Major landing (3) Minor landing (26) Patch landing (46) All
Major client landing 93 (90.29%) 82 (16.70%) 365 (23.06%) 540
Minor client landing 0 (0.00%) 292 (59.47%) 767 (48.45%) 1,059
Patch client landing 0 (0.00%) 27 (5.50%) 280 (17.69%) 307
Dependency removal 10 (9.71%) 90 (18.33% 171 (10.80%) 271
All 103 491 1,583 2,177
we apply Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric statistical test (Kruskal and Wallis,
1952). We test the null hypothesis that ‘lags in the latest and supported lin-
eages are the same’. We investigate the effect size using Cliff’s δ, which is a
non-parametric effect size measure (Romano et al, 2006). Effect size are ana-
lyzed as follows: (1) |δ| < 0.147 as Negligible, (2) 0.147 ≤ |δ| <0.33 as Small,
(3) 0.33 ≤ |δ| <0.474 as Medium, or (4) 0.474 ≤ |δ| as Large. To analyze
Cliff’s δ, we use the cliffsDelta package13.
4.4 Results to the Empirical Study
(RQ1) Is the fixing release update consistent with the client-side fix
release update? Our results are summarized into two findings. First, Table
5 shows the evidence that most of fixing release updates are patch landing.
As shown in the first row of a table, we find that 46 out of 75 fixing releases
have patch landing (highlighted in red). We also find that there are 3 major
landings and 26 minor landings. This finding complements the result of (PQ1).
Second, Table 5 shows the evidence that the client-side fixing release up-
date follows the fixing release update except for a case of a patch client landing.
As highlighted in Patch client landing row of Table 5, we find that there are
only 17.69% of clients adopt a patch landing as patch client landings. Instead,
clients are more likely have minor client landings i.e., 48.45% of clients (high-
lighted in red). The other fixing release updates are consistent with client-side
fixing release updates. We find that 93.29% of clients adopt a major land-
ing as major client landings and 59.47% of clients have minor client landings
in a minor landing (highlighted in green).
For the statistical evaluation, we find that there is an association between
the fixing release update and the client-side fixing release update. Table 6
shows that our null hypothesis on ‘the fixing release update and the client-side
fixing release update are independent’ is rejected (i.e., χ2 = 327.41, p-value
< 0.001). From the Cramér’s V effect size (φ′), we got a value of 0.27 which
show the medium level of association.
13 https://github.com/neilernst/cliffsDelta
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Table 6 A result of statistical test for (RQ1).
Statistic Value
Pearson’s chi-squared test (χ2) 327.41
p-value 1.09× 10−67
Cramér’s V (φ′) 0.27
Table 7 A summary statistic of lags in the propagation (# days) categorized by lineage
freshness. Note that lags in the table is not accumulative.
Down Prop. # clients Mean Median SD
LL
1 15,580 567.98 517.95 424.78
2 22,887 310.75 279.30 246.57
3 16,640 490.63 459.35 350.78
≥ 4 7,727 332.34 234.57 321.81
62,834
SL
1 6,178 281.36 242.19 238.61
2 4,606 219.94 199.10 175.59
3 665 139.92 102.41 142.00
≥ 4 101 77.30 28.31 105.31
11,550
Answer to (RQ1): No, the fixing release update is not consistent
with client-side fixing release update. We find that only 17.69% of
clients that performed a patch client landing with a patch landing.
The evidence suggests that since clients keep stale dependencies, more
migration effort is required to fix that client (i.e., minor or major client
landing).
(RQ2) Do lineage freshness and severity influence lags in the fix
propagation? Our results are summarized into two findings. First, Table 7
shows the evidence that the lineage freshness influences lags in a propagation.
As highlighted in red, we find that LL has more lags than SL in terms of days
for every downstream propagation e.g., median of lags for the first hop: 517.95
days > 242.19 days.
Second, Table 8 shows the evidence that the vulnerability severity influ-
ences lags in a propagation. As highlighted in green, we find that the low
severity fixing release has the least lags than others in every hop e.g., the
first hop: 126.13 days. We also find that the medium severity fix has the most
lags than others as highlighted in red e.g., the first hop: 468.85 days. How-
ever, there is the exception where clients at the second hop suffer the most
lags when they adopt the high severity fix i.e., the second hop: 293.15 days.
For the statistical evaluation, we find that lags in the latest and supported
lineages are statistically different. Table 9 shows that our null hypothesis on
whether ‘lags in the latest and supported lineages are the same’ is rejected i.e.,
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Table 8 A summary statistic of lags in the propagation (# days) categorized by vulnera-
bility severity. Note that lags in the table is not accumulative.
Down Prop. # clients Mean Median SD
H
1 2,916 326.89 257.94 286.69
2 7,553 302.77 293.15 207.77
3 2,314 201.82 147.40 189.46
≥ 4 582 144.81 94.27 157.21
13,365
M
1 17,261 540.29 468.85 415.00
2 15,756 312.17 269.05 263.10
3 14,472 533.47 526.15 349.14
≥ 4 7,179 346.42 259.01 326.72
54,668
L
1 1,581 194.88 126.13 187.00
2 4,184 219.85 204.73 169.11
3 519 134.21 84.39 138.58
≥ 4 67 68.44 14.09 98.55
6,351
Table 9 A comparison of lags in the propagation between clients that adopt the latest
lineage and supported lineage fixing release (LL = median of the latest lineage, SL = median
of the supported lineage, * = statistically significant), (Medium, Large) = effect size.
Downstream Dep. H M L
1 LL >SL * (Medium) LL >SL * (Medium) LL <SL * (Medium)
2 LL >SL * ( Large) LL >SL * (Medium) LL <SL * (Large)
3 LL >SL LL >SL * (Large) LL <SL * (Medium)
≥ 4 LL >SL LL >SL -
the first hop to the third hop for medium and low severity and the first hop
to the second hop for high severity. It also shows that the effect sizes of the
differences are noticeable i.e., medium to large.
Answer to (RQ2): Yes, lineage freshness and severity influence lags in
the propagation. We find that fixing releases that occur on the latest
lineage and medium severity suffer the most lags.
5 Discussion
5.1 Lessons Learned
This section discusses three main implications based on our results in (PQ1),
(PQ2), (RQ1), and (RQ2). These are presented as lessons learned and could
have implications for both practitioner and researcher.
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1. Release cycle matters. According to the results of (PQ2), fixing commits
are small with less than 7.14% of fixing commits in the fixing release. We
suspect that vulnerability fix repackage is a cause for lags. Hence, devel-
opers of the vulnerable packages are recommended to release fixes as soon
as they have applied the fix, if not they should highlight these fixes when
bundling the fix. Additionally, from ten randomly selected vulnerabilities,
we found that discussions between developers did not include explicit men-
tion of the vulnerability i.e., GitHub issue, commit, and pull request. Since
developers bundled the fix with other updates, developers may have been
unaware. In summary, researchers should provide strategies for making the
most efficient update via the release cycle. Furthermore, practitioners can
upgrade security fixes as first class citizens, so that the vulnerability fix can
travel quicker throughout the ecosystem.
2. Awareness is important. According to (PQ1) and (RQ1), 57.25% of fixes are
a patch landing. However, clients are more likely to have major client land-
ing and minor client landing i.e., 23.06% and 48.45%, than the patch client
landing i.e., 10.80%. Security fixes need to be highlighted in the update
note, as a possible reason is for failure to update because client developers
are more interested in major features that are highlighted in an update.
Recently, some open source communities start to make tools to highlight
the vulnerability problems in a software ecosystem. GitHub (GitHub, 2017)
made a new function for notifying a new vulnerability from the dependency
list of clients. Also, npm (NPM, 2018) made a new command for listing
the vulnerability information in downloaded dependencies of clients. From
a result of (PQ2), explicit fixing release with a highlight of the vulnera-
bility is needed to speed up the adoption. In summary, researchers and
practitioners need to provide developers more awareness mechanisms to al-
low quicker planning of the update. The good news is current initiatives
like GitHub security are trending towards this. Clients are more likely to
adopt a fix, if they are aware that it is highlighted.
3. Migration cost effort. From our first finding of (RQ2), the fixing release in
the latest lineage suffers more lags that the supported lineage in terms of
days. A possible reason is that developers of clients consider a package in
the supported lineage is more worthwhile to adopt the new release than the
latest lineage regardless the fix. In terms of security, according to the official
documentation of npm (NPM, 2016), when a security threat is identified,
the following severity policy is put into action: (a) P0: Drop everything and
fix!, (b) P1: High severity, schedule work within 7 days, (c) P2: Medium
severity, (d) schedule work within 30 days, (e) P3: Low severity, fix within
180 days. Surprisingly, second finding of (RQ2) shows evidence that low
severity fixes are adopted just as quick as high severity fixes. A possible
reason for the quicker adopting of low severity could be because the fix
is easier to integrate into the application. In summary, researchers and
practitioners is that package developers in npm seem to require additional
time before updating their dependencies.
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5.2 Threats to Validity
Internal Validity - We discuss three internal threats. The first threat is the
correctness of tools and techniques used in this study. We use the listed de-
pendencies and version number as defined in the package.json meta-file. The
threat is that sometimes some dependencies are not listed or semantic version
is invalid and vice-versa, so we applied a filter to remove clients that do not
follow the semantic versioning, thus making this threat minimal. The second
threat is the tools used to implement our defined terminology (i.e., numpy,
scipy, gitpython, and semantic-version). To mitigate this, we carefully con-
firmed our results by manually validating the results for (RQ1) and (RQ2),
then also manually validating results with statistics on the npm website. For
the existing tool for suggesting the fixing release like npm-audit, we found
that this tool was inappropriate to use in this work due to its limitation of
the package-lock.json file is required for analyzing repositories, which only
2.27% of repositories of the dataset and the tool assumes the latest informa-
tion. Unlike our work, we analyzed the data available in the historical snapshot.
As the correctness of dependency relations is dependent on getting all depen-
dencies, the final internal threat is the validity of our collected data. In this
study, our ecosystem is made up of packages and clients that were either or
affected directly or transitively by at least a single vulnerability. We also con-
sider only normal dependencies listed in the package.json file to make sure
that the packages are used in production environment, not only for testing.
Other types of dependencies including: (1) devDependencies, (2) peerDepen-
dencies, (3) bundledDependencies, and (4) optionalDependencies are ignored
in this study. We are confident that the result of (RQ2) are not affected by
invalid data.
External Validity - The main external threat is the generality of other
results to other ecosystems. In this study, we focused solely on the npm
JavaScript ecosystem. However, our analysis is applicable to other ecosystems
that have similar package management system e.g., PyPI for Python, Maven
for Java. Immediate future plans include studying the lags in other ecosys-
tems. Another threat is the sample size of the analyzed data. In this study, we
analyzed only 188 matched vulnerability reports from 792 extracted reports
on snyk.io. This small size of sample data might not be able to represent the
population. However, we are confident of the data quality and reduced bias as
we followed strict methods to validate by two authors for (PQ1), (PQ2), and
(RQ1) data.
Construct Validity - The key threat is that there may be other factors apart
from the two factors lineage freshness and vulnerability severity. We believe
the bias are minimal and validate our selection of these factors since they were
discussed in prior studies related to dependency updating and vulnerability
impact i.e., measuring of dependency freshness from Cox et al (2015), impact of
a vulnerability to transitive dependencies from Kikas et al (2017), responding
to a vulnerability NPM (2016).
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6 Related Work
Complementary the related work introduced throughout the paper, in this
section, we discuss some key related work.
On Updating Dependencies - These studies relate to the migration of li-
braries to the latest versions of libraries. With new libraries and newer versions
of existing libraries continuously being released, managing a system library
dependencies is a concern on its own. As outlined in Bogart et al (2016); Rae-
maekers et al (2012); Teyton et al (2012), dependency management includes
making cost-benefit decisions related to keeping or updating dependencies on
outdated libraries. Additionally, Bavota et al (2015); Hora et al (2015); Ihara
et al (2017); Robbes et al (2012); Sawant et al (2016) showed that updating
libraries and their APIs are slow and lagging. Kula et al (2018) found that
such update decisions are not only influenced by whether or not security vul-
nerabilities have been fixed and important features have been improved, but
also by the amount of work required to accommodate changes in the API of a
newer library version. Recently, Abdalkareem et al (2017); Decan et al (2017);
Mirhosseini and Parnin (2017) also studied dependency issues at the ecosystem
level. Our work focuses on the lag of the fix instead of vulnerability itself.
Our work complements also the findings of prior work, with the similar goal
of encouraging developers to update.
On Malware and Vulnerabilities - These studies relate to security vulner-
ability within the software ecosystem from various aspects. Recent studies
try to look at the impact of vulnerability within the ecosystem by looking
at dependencies usage (Decan et al, 2018; Hejderup, 2015; Kikas et al, 2017;
Lauinger et al, 2017; Linares-Vásquez et al, 2017). These results show that
vulnerability able to affect the wide range of clients in the ecosystem. There is
a study about the relationship between bugs and vulnerabilities, to conclude
that the relationship is weak (Munaiah et al, 2017). In order to increase the
awareness of developers to the security vulnerability, some studies try to cre-
ate a tool to detect and alert vulnerability when it disclosed (Cadariu et al,
2015; GitHub, 2018b). There is a study about addressing the over-estimation
problem for reporting the vulnerable dependencies in open source communi-
ties and the impact of vulnerable libraries usage in the industry (Pashchenko
et al, 2018). Additionally, some studies try to predict the vulnerability of soft-
ware system by analyzing source code (Alhazmi et al, 2007; Chowdhury and
Zulkernine, 2011; Shin and Williams, 2008). Our work takes a look at the
vulnerable code and its fix at the commit-level, instead of the release-level in
prior studies. We also propose a set of definitions and measures to characterize
the discovery and fixing release process, which covers both direct and transitive
dependencies. Prior work instead only analyzes the direct dependencies.
Mining-related studies - These studies relate to the mining technique in
the software repository and software ecosystem. The first step of software
repository mining is data collection and extraction. Researchers need to have
the data sources and know about which part of the data can use in their work.
In the case of the npm package repository, we can extract the information of
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packages from package.jsonmeta-file (Mirhosseini and Parnin, 2017; Wittern
et al, 2016). In the case of the security vulnerability, we can collect data
from CommonWeakness Enumeration (CWE) (Mitre Corporation, 2018b) and
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) (Mitre Corporation, 2018a)
database (Alhazmi et al, 2007; Cadariu et al, 2015; Chowdhury and Zulkernine,
2011; Lauinger et al, 2017; Linares-Vásquez et al, 2017; Munaiah et al, 2017).
To study the issues within the software ecosystem, we also define the traversal
of the downstream clients by using the dependency list of clients. These studies
introduce some technique to model the dependency graph (Bavota et al, 2015;
Hejderup, 2015; Kikas et al, 2017). Our work uses similar mining techniques
to extract the dependencies as well as construct the ecosystem. In our work,
we manually extract and investigate the commits to understand the contents
of the fix.
7 Conclusion
Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies are a growing concern for the soft-
ware developers as the risk of it could be extended to the entire software
ecosystem. To ensure quick adoption and propagation of a fixing release, we
conduct an empirical investigation to identify lags that may occur between the
vulnerable release and its fixing release from a case study of npm JavaScript
ecosystem. We found that the fixing release is rarely released on its own, with
up to 92.86% of the bundled commits in a fixing release being unrelated to
the fix. We then found that a quick fixing release update (i.e., patch landing)
does not always ensure that a client will adopt it quicker, with only 17.69% of
clients matching a patch landing to a patch client landing. Furthermore, fac-
tors such as the lineage freshness and the vulnerability severity do influence
its propagation.
In addition to theses lags that we identified and characterized, this paper
lays the groundwork for future research on how to mitigate these propagation
lags in an ecosystem. We suggest that researchers should provide strategies
for making the most efficient update via the release cycle. Practitioners also
need more awareness to allow quicker planning of the update. Potential future
avenues for researchers includes (i) a developer survey to better understanding
the reason for the release and adoption of fixes, (ii) a tool for highlighting
fixing releases, (iii) a tool for managing and prioritizing vulnerability fixing
process.
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